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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the degree to which predictive modeling 
techniques can enhance the quality of contractor source selection decisions. Use risk 
indicators created from existing publicly available contracting datasets to predict which 
contractors are most likely to perform successfully. Examples of risk indicators are 
quantitative measurements of contractor dollar velocity, instability in federal contract 
business, and level of experience in performing similarly sized contracts. Examine how big 
data analytics can be used to augment traditional source selection techniques such as 
proposal evaluation and past performance/responsibility checks. 
Introduction 
A primary goal of public-sector contracting, and more broadly, public procurement 
policy, is to ensure value in the use of public funds (Dimitri, 2013; Hawkins et al., 2016; 
Rendon & Rendon, 2016). The concept of value creation in business-to-government 
exchange, while latent and challenging to assess, has taken on an increased importance in 
the policies surrounding public procurement (e.g., Kendall, 2015; Weichert, 2019), just as it 
has in the management of industrial supply chains (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003; Ketchen & 
Hult, 2007). However, despite the ubiquity of contracting in the public and private sectors, 
organizations both public and private struggle to effectively and efficiently contract out for 
goods and services, often failing to achieve full value for their contract dollars (Rich, 2018). 
In extreme cases, contractual risks and hazards may lead to severe post-award issues, such 
as contract failure (Rendon et al., 2014) and contract termination (Davison & Sebastian, 
2006, 2009). Understanding these cases is important not only because severe contractual 
issues (e.g., contract failure) jeopardize value and performance of taxpayer funds but 
because they may diminish an agency’s ability to execute critical programs and deliver 
governmental services core to agencies’ missions.  
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The purpose of this research is to uncover antecedents and to develop a predictive 
model of severe contractual performance issues, such as those leading to contract failure, in 
transactions between federal agencies and their suppliers. Existing empirical research into 
this topic has been limited and has largely focused on transaction-level factors leading to 
contract performance problems and/or contract termination. In contrast, this research 
examines factors at the firm-level, and utilizing data now publically available on contractor 
performance and integrity issues, proposes a predictive model through the application of 
random decision forests, a machine learning technique. To do this, firm-level antecedents 
are collected from multiple, publicly available data sources, including the Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS) and the System for Award Management (SAM). Incidents 
of contract failure are identified within the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity 
Information System (FAPIIS). The resulting random forest model exhibits excellent 
classification performance, as measured by out-of-bag error rate and provides information 
on the relative importance of firm-level factors. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Within the following section, we 
provide a brief review of the literature on contract failure in public-sector procurement. Next, 
we describe the data and our modeling approach, followed by the results of our analysis. 
The final section provides a discussion of the findings and provides several 
recommendations. 
Prior Research 
There has been only limited research into the factors leading to severe performance 
issues in public-sector procurement, and more specifically, contract failure and the 
dissolution of government-supplier relationships. Of the prior work in this area, most 
research has tended to focus on the analysis of transaction-level factors and how these 
factors correlate to post-award contractual issues. Davison and Sebastian (2009) explored 
associations between product/service type and the occurrences of severe problems in 
contract administration, finding that performance delays were the most prevalent problem 
encountered by contract administrators, with problems arising from other forms of risk—
proposal risk, surety and liability risk, contractual risk, and price risk—varying based on the 
class of goods or services under contract. Rendon et al. (2014) similarly performed an 
examination at the transaction level, investigating contract failure rates under defense 
services contracts. The authors found significant differences in failure rates based on 
contract type and value, but—in contrast to the findings of Davison and Sebastian (2009)—
did not find the rates to differ by service type, nor did they find rates to differ by level of 
competition (Rendon et al., 2014). In a later analysis, Dixon et al. (2015) extended the work 
of Rendon et al. (2014), in part, by applying techniques common to predictive analytics 
(logistic regression, decision-tree analysis, neural networks) to uncover the determinants of 
contractor performance ratings on defense services contracts. Among their findings, Dixon 
et al. (2015) identified a positive relationship between the workload of contract 
administration personnel and the likelihood of contract failure, such that failures appear to 
become more likely to occur as workload increases. Along those lines, prior research (e.g., 
Brown & Potoski, 2003) has also emphasized the importance of post-award management 
activities, such as monitoring, arguing that risks of contract failure will increase if these 
activities are under-resourced. Most recently, Liebman and Mahoney (2017) examined 
contractor performance on major, public-sector information technology contracts and found 
performance to be lower on end-of-year (i.e., last week) purchases. Interestingly, the 
authors found that, upon deeper analysis, these overall performance differences appear to 
be most strongly driven by an individual component: perceptive evaluations made by agency 
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chief information officers (CIOs). However, these evaluations are not linked directly to 
incidents of contract failure. 
Our examination focuses heavily on one of the most severe cases of failure—also 
representing the most frequent entry in FAPIIS—the government’s termination of a 
contractor for default of the contractor (or for cause). A termination for default is defined 
here as the government’s exercise of a contractual right to terminate a contract, or some 
portion thereof, due to the failure of a contractor to perform its contractual obligations 
(James, 1963).1 In general, the termination of federal contractors for default involves such 
“serious consequences for a contractor, they are considered drastic sanctions that should 
be imposed or sustained only for good grounds and on solid evidence” (GAO, 2008). Yet, 
terminations for default (and cause) are not uncommon in public procurement. For instance, 
in 1994, the Government Accountability Office noted that the General Services 
Administration (GSA) terminated “hundreds” of contracts annually as a result of contractor 
default (GAO, 1994). As of 2015, terminations for default and for cause, and other severe 
issues (e.g., instances of defective pricing, subcontractor non-payment) are reported to the 
FAPIIS (2 CFR § 200.340), with records currently numbering in the thousands. FAPIIS 
records remain active for five years, during which time agencies are required to review and 
consider information contained in the system prior to making a contract award over the 
simplified acquisition threshold (41 U.S.C. 2313(d)(3)). The government’s acquisition policy 
states that contracting officers will consider information in FAPIIS when determining 
responsibility of a prospective contractor, and separately, when evaluating the past 
performance of offerors during source selections (48 CFR § 9.104-6). Accordingly, a primary 
intent of the government’s policy (and the resulting FAPIIS system) is to provide acquisition 
officials across the government insight into the performance and integrity of suppliers; the 
effect is to broaden knowledge and, potentially, the impact of severe contractor performance 
and integrity issues beyond that of the individual transaction. In many cases, inclusion of a 
severe issue in FAAPIS may lead toward ultimate dissolution of the government’s 
relationship with a supplier (e.g., as it applies to new contract awards). The purpose of this 
study is to add to the existing literature regarding contract failure in public sector 
procurement through the development of a predictive model for severe performance issues.  
Methodology 
Introduction 
As the intent of this research is to generate a predictive model of performance 
issues, we rely on techniques from the machine learning statistical tradition, namely the 
random forest modeling technique (Breiman, 2001). The random forest is a supervised, tree-
based prediction strategy that seeks to reduce overfitting and improve generalizability 
through aggregated estimates from an ensemble of trees. Model performance (e.g., 
predictive accuracy) is measured utilizing out-of-bag (OOB) estimates which, according to 
Breiman (2001), eliminates the need for reserving some portion of the data for cross-
                                            
 
 
1 Similarly, FAPIIS defines a termination for cause as the “exercise of the Government’s right by a 
contracting officer to completely or partially terminate a contract if the Contractor fails to comply with 
any contract terms and conditions, or fails to provide the Government, upon request, with adequate 
assurances of future performance. Terminations for Cause are similar to Terminations for Default, but 
are applicable to contracts awarded using commercial procedures.” 
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validation, while reducing bias. Applications of random forests can be readily found within 
the scientific literature and across numerous fields. Their popularity is owed, in part, to the 
ability of the random forest to handle high-dimensional data with relatively few observations, 
while providing measures for the relative importance of variables (Grömping, 2009). 
Sample 
Observations of contract terminations and other severe issues were obtained from 
FAPIIS, which contains reports on terminations and other severe contract issues that have 
occurred over a five-year period (early 2014 to early 2019). As the unit of analysis for this 
research is the firm, and since multiple records can exist in FAPIIS for a single firm, we 
identify for each firm the first date that the firm was entered into FAPIIS. We uniquely identify 
firms by their DUNS number, resulting in 1,602 distinct entities. After joining FAPIIS records 
with data from SAM and data from the FPDS, and then removing entities with missing or 
incomplete data, we are left with a sample of 780 firms. We then pair this sample with a 
random sample of 780 firms who did not have severe issues reported in FAPIIS during this 
period, thus creating a balanced dataset. Accordingly, our final sample size is 1,560 firms—
a size which is comparable to sample sizes used in prior research within this area (e.g., 
Dixon et al., 2015). 
Response Variable 
The response variable in our analysis is a binary indicator of a severe contractual 
performance or integrity issue, as reported/indicated in FAPIIS. Of the 780 firms in our 
dataset with this indicator, the first entry in FAPIIS for the majority (734 firms, or 94%) was a 
termination for default or cause. As previously mentioned, FAPIIS defines termination for 
default as exercising the government’s right to completely or partially terminate a contract 
because of the contractor’s actual or anticipated failure to perform its contractual obligations. 
Termination for cause is the commercial item contract version of a default termination. For 
the remaining 46 firms, reasons for inclusion in FAPIIS included Department of Defense 
Determination of Contractor Fault, Non-Responsibility Determination, and Subcontractor 
Payment Issues. 
Explanatory Variables 
We identify and utilize several firm-level features (i.e., variables) to predict 
occurrences of severe performance issues. Longitudinal data on a firm’s contractual 
relationship with the federal government is obtained from the FPDS, using federal-wide data 
starting with Fiscal Year 2009. Summary information on total contract obligations for five 
recent years is shown in Figure 1. We begin our analysis with data at Fiscal Year 2009 as 
implementation of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 
resulted in significant improvements to the quality of contract metadata contained in FPDS 
(Lewis, 2017). For firms experiencing a severe performance issue, FPDS data used to 
calculate measures extends through the period prior to a severe issue.2 We account for 
time-series components of a firm’s contractual exchanges with the federal government in 
three ways. First, we include a variable obligations_mean to account for the average level 
                                            
 
 
2 Here, “period prior” means the starting period of the analysis (Fiscal Year 2009) through the fiscal 
year preceding a firm’s first record in FAPIIS. Our measures do not include the fiscal year of the 
severe issue and associated report in FAPIIS, as contractual deobligations are likely to accompany 
terminations and thus may confound relationships under study. 
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(amount in dollars) of annualized business the entity engaged in with federal agencies. 
Second, we include a variable obligations_growth to account for the change in annual 
obligations over the period of analysis, operationalized as the sum of first differences of the 
time series data. Third, to account for stability (or variability/volatility) in exchanges with 
federal agencies, we take the standard deviation of first differences of annual obligations, 
following Doboeck et al. (2009). We label this variable obligations_variability, given that 
higher values on the measure reflect a greater degree of variability. Next, we account the 
level of diversification in a firm’s federal clientele and in the industries that it operates in 
within its capacity as a federal contractor. We operationalize diversification in clientele as 
the pooled mean of the annualized count of distinct federal agencies that the firm conducted 
business with over the period of analysis. Agencies are identified using the Contracting 
Agency Code in FPDS; we refer to the resulting variable as diversification_agencies. 
Similarly, we operationalize diversification in industries that a firm operates in (within its 
capacity as a federal contractor) as the pooled mean of the annualized count of distinct 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes as reported in FPDS; we 
refer to the resulting variable as diversification_industries. Following the finding of Rendon et 
al. (2014) that contract failure rates were highest among competitively awarded contracts, 
we include a measure, competition, reflecting the average number of offers agencies 
received in response to solicitations for contracts awarded to the firm during the period of 
analysis. 
 
Figure 1. Five Years of Contract Obligations (Fiscal Years 2014–2018) 
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Next, we obtained entity information on the firms from SAM. We account for a firm’s 
age in two ways, first, as the amount of time elapsed, in days, between the firm’s business 
start date and the period prior to a severe issue (if any). SAM describes their data on 
Business State Date as follows: “The date the entity was started or acquired.” We refer to 
this measure as days_since_bus_start. Second, we account for a firm’s tenure in the federal 
market, days_since_registration, measured as the number of days between a firm’s 
registration as a federal contractor and the period prior to a severe issue (if any). SAM 
describes their data on Registration Date as follows: “The date the initial entity registration 
was submitted, this date will not change.” Lastly, we account for firm’s corporate structure, 
using the Corporate Structure Code field in SAM; SAM defines this field as follows: “The 
structure of the entity as defined by the IRS, as a code.” Of the total 1,560 firms, 70.32% 
(1097) were corporations, 8.65% (135) were partnerships, 6.03% (94) were sole 
proprietorships, 3.46% (54) were tax-exempt corporations, 2.44% (38) were international 
organizations, and 9.10% (142) fell into other categories of corporate structure. 
Results 
A random forest model was estimated in R using the randomForest package (Liaw & 
Weiner, 2002). Two parameters are primarily of interest. First, we set the model parameter 
corresponding to the number of predictor variables (p) sampled at each split to a value of 
three, which is equivalent to the square root of p; this heuristic has been found to be optimal 
in several empirical studies and, accordingly, is seen as a reasonable default (Strobl et al., 
2008). We also observed poorer predictive performance at higher and lower values. 
Second, we set the number of trees at 4,096. There is no scientific standard for the number 
of trees to grow in a random forest; however, up to a point, the addition of trees will improve 
predictive performance and the interpretation of variable importance measures (Strobl et al., 
2009). We observed that meaningful improvements to model performance were not realized 
beyond this point (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Effect of Number of Trees on Model Error Rate 
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Estimation of the random forest model resulted in an overall classification 
performance of 81.41% (i.e., 18.59% misclassification), based on the out-of-bag error rate. 
The model performed marginally better at classifying firms who did not experience severe 
issues during the period of analysis (false positive rate of 17.31%) than it did at classifying 
firms who did (false negative rate of 19.87%). Variable importance measures are provided 
within Table 1, and importance for each variable is assessed by the associated decrease in 
node impurities, as measured by the Gini index. Higher values of Gini importance reflect 
greater importance. As seen in Figure 3, the tenure of firms (days since business start and 
days since registration as a contractor) was the most important variable in the model, 
followed by industrial diversification, the average level of competition firms faced on 
government contracts that they won, the diversification of firms’ federal clientele (agencies), 
the level, growth and variability of firms’ business with the federal government, and, lastly, 
the corporate structure of firms in the sample. 
 
Figure 3. Gini Importance of Variables 
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Discussion 
Each year the federal government receives a large quantity of contractor offers—
proposals or other vendor-supplied information (e.g., oral presentations or product 
demonstrations). These proposals receive carefully written evaluations by government 
technical experts and contracting officials. Proposals and other vendor-supplied information 
contain a wealth of information on technical approaches to meeting specific agency mission 
needs. Further, proposals often contain corporate experience and past performance 
information. Contracting officers use platforms such as the Contractor Performance 
Assessment Rating System (CPARS) and FAPIIS to assess the responsibility of prospective 
contractors and to evaluate past performance. While both platforms are valuable, each has 
significant gaps. For instance, CPARS past performance narratives are sometimes not 
completed, have inconsistent information quality, and have a significant time lag (due to the 
annual evaluation cycle). FAPIIS lists contractors that experienced an adverse termination 
but does not track all types of contractor performance issues—only those that tend to be 
severe in nature. Further, both CPARS and FAPIIS are lagging indicators of performance 
issues. However, our results show some of the most severe contract performance issues 
might be predicted using publicly available data alone, as classification performance for the 
random forest model exceeded 80% using only nine variables. While we are careful not to 
suggest that a statistical model should be used in isolation in source selections, model 
estimates may very well serve as additional information that prompt deeper research and 
analysis, or when considered in concert with all other information, help to form an 
assessment of a prospective contractor’s likely future performance. 
In general, the results of this analysis suggest that a data-driven predictive modeling 
approach can be used to correctly identify (classify) a sizeable percentage of contractors 
who will later go on to experience a severe performance or integrity issue. Given that 
agency resources are finite, and given that a primary purpose of the public procurement is to 
ensure value for taxpayer dollars, predicting performance issues early—especially prior to 
the award of a contract—is important. Again, our analysis highlights the potential role that 
data analytics may serve to inform and even augment efforts by contracting officials. For 
one, data analytics can inform contracting officers with a picture of a vendor’s overall federal 
business. The presence of similar, successful past contracts may evidence capability to 
perform on future requirements of the same type and scale. The absence of similar, federal 
prime contracts would likewise indicate that more information may be needed to make a 
determination of contractor responsibility. Further, analytics can help answer often-opaque 
questions regarding a contractor’s ability to comply with the required delivery schedules, 
taking into consideration existing commercial and governmental business commitments. For 
example, a recent and sizable (even anomalous) increase in contract awards might prompt 
scrutiny regarding a contractor’s capacity to handle additional volume. 
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Table 1. Notional Application of Data Analytics for Evaluation of Corporate Experience 
Example Evaluation Factor for Corporate 
Experience 
Analytics-Enhanced Evaluation Factor of 
Corporate Experience 
The Offeror shall provide at least two, but no 
more than three examples of relevant and 
recent contracts performed. 
 
“Recent” is defined as a contract performed 
within the last three (3) years from the 
submission deadline. If a contract is ongoing, 
it must be at least one year into performance 
by the submission deadline. 
 
“Relevant” is defined as a contract that is of 
similar size, scope, and complexity to the 
requirements as set forth in this solicitation. 
 
A minimum of one (1) contract shall be the 
experience of the Offeror performing as a 
prime. The other contract(s) may be 
experience of the Offeror performing as a 
subcontractor, or the experience of a 
proposed subcontractor. Experience where 
the Offeror performed as a prime will be 
considered most favorably.  
The Government will evaluate offerors 
experience on federal prime contracts of a 
similar size, scope, and complexity. Dollar 
amounts, the type of work, data derived risk 
metrics, and any other contract data available 
may be considered in the evaluation of 
experience. Offerors may submit a 
supplemental corporate experience narrative 
describing experience on subcontracts, non-
federal contracts, and/or providing additional 
information regarding prime contract 
experience. 
 
A primary recommendation is for the development of an open platform for analytics 
to support procurement decisions by federal agencies and their acquisition workforce. Along 
these lines, Executive Order 13859 (Trump, 2019) states that the government should 
prioritize the development of open data models and reduce barriers to their deployment. 
Contracting officers would benefit from having a website that summarizes data and risk 
characteristics of a vendor. Currently, USASpending.gov does allow viewing dollars by year 
and the top five transactions for specific contractors (recipients). That said, the below 
prototype shows the potential for more robust information that could be evaluated during a 
source selection. Notably, the vendor shown below experienced a rapid, five-fold increase in 
dollars during Fiscal Year 2018. Further, notice the two dollars (each representing a different 
agency that obligated over $10 million). The dots for the large dollar obligations are 
separated from small actions by quite a lot of whitespace (this is a relatively small vendor 
that suddenly received much larger than typical contracts). 
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Figure 4. Prototype of a Procurement Analytics Platform 
Limitations 
We would be remiss not to acknowledge that limitations exist in our study and 
analysis. First, as the focus of our research is on firm-level characteristics, factors at other 
levels may influence the likelihood of contract failures. For instance, at the agency level, 
increases in an agency’s capability and capacity to manage (i.e., administer) contracts and 
monitor contractor performance should decrease the likelihood of contract failures (Brown & 
Potoski, 2003). Further, evidence suggests that macroeconomic factors can exert a strong 
influence on the behavior of parties in buyer–supplier relationships (Krause & Ellram, 2014). 
We are unaware, to date, of research that has investigated how contract outcomes in the 
public sector might be influenced by between or within-industry variation (e.g., those relating 
to cyclical nature of the economy). More broadly, the literature recognizes that numerous 
forces come to bear on the effectiveness of public procurement, including market forces, 
internal forces, legal forces, social and economic forces, and forces internal to governments 
(Thai, 2001). 
An additional limitation of our research involves the generalizability of findings. Given 
that our objective was to develop a predictive model, we sought to generalize to future 
times. We selected a model technique—random decision forests—as to minimize overfitting 
to the data (e.g., fitting to sample-specific idiosyncrasies in the data set). However, we are 
unable to state with certainty that the relationships uncovered in the data analysis are truly 
time-invariant. 
Lastly, our choice of statistical technique comes with several trade-offs. One primary 
benefit of the approach is that it is able to account for non-linearities in the relationships 
between our explanatory variables and the response. However, this also comes at a cost of 
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interpretability, as an easily interpretable coefficient reflecting the direction and magnitude of 
a relationship, such as what one might obtain in log-odds form from a logistic regression, is 
not directly estimated. As such, while we are able to assess the overall performance of the 
model and even assess the relative importance of variables in the model, we are not able to 
readily express and interpret relationships as might be accomplished after estimation of a 
parametric regression model. 
Future Research 
This research effort represents an initial, and very limited, investigation into the 
feasibility of predicting severe, future contractual issues through the analysis of open data. 
As such, it represents a first iteration, albeit one that suggests a high degree of promise. 
Future work should expand the variables and features under analysis (e.g., to include 
transaction-level variables, to include data on the economy) and explore alternative 
parametric and non-parametric modeling techniques.  
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